

MESSAGE

FROM THE

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

TRANSMITTING

*A report from Major General Jesup of his operations whilst commanding the army in Florida, in compliance with a resolution of the Senate of the 6th instant.*

JULY 7, 1838.

Laid on the table, and ordered to be printed.

WASHINGTON, July 7, 1838.

SIR: In conformity with the resolution of the Senate, I transmit, herewith, the report of Major General Jesup, together with a letter from the Secretary of War.

M. VAN BUREN.

To the PRESIDENT of the Senate.

WAR DEPARTMENT, July 7, 1838.

SIR: In obedience to your directions, I have the honor to transmit, herewith, the report of Major General Jesup of his operations while commanding the army of Florida, together with my reply.

I am, sir, respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

To the PRESIDENT of the United States.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR,

July 7, 1838.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 6th instant, containing a summary account of your operations in Florida. The department is aware of the obstacles to your complete success, presented by the face of the country, the nature of the climate, and the character of the enemy, and fully appreciates your untiring efforts to carry out all its views, and to remove the Seminoles to their new homes in the west. You have accomplished all that could be expected, under the

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peculiar and difficult circumstances in which you were placed, from a zealous, active, and energetic officer; and in withdrawing you from Florida, the department was actuated by no want of confidence in your zeal or ability to carry on the war to a successful issue, but from a belief that you might now return to the performance of the appropriate duties of your department without injury to the public service.

Very respectfully,

Your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP,

*Washington city.*

WASHINGTON CITY, July 6, 1838.

SIR: Having been relieved from duty in Florida, by the orders of the Government, I deem it proper to present a narrative of the principal operations of the army under my command, as well as an explanation of the measures which I considered it my duty to adopt, during the last campaign in that Territory; reserving to myself the right to present a more detailed report, so soon as a release from my other duties will afford me the time to prepare it.

When I presented a project of a plan of campaign on the 15th of June, of last year, I neither expected nor desired to retain the command of the army. I believed that I had accomplished all that it was possible for me to accomplish with the means placed at my disposal: yet I was aware the public, and particularly the people of Florida, were not satisfied with what had been done. Florida presented no field for military distinction. I had gone thither by the order of the Government, at great personal sacrifice, with no object in view, beyond the faithful performance of my duty. I felt that I had performed that duty to the best of my abilities; but I believed the interests of the country required that the commander of the troops should possess entirely the public confidence; as without that confidence no military man can perform his duties efficiently under a popular Government; and I hold that the moment the public confidence is withdrawn from a General, the Executive is bound to remove him: for no matter what may be his merits, or how transcendent his abilities, his private and personal interests should not be put in competition with the interests of the nation. Such being my sentiments and opinions, I could not for a moment permit the Executive to be embarrassed by any considerations personal to myself, and I asked, through the Adjutant General, to be relieved from command.

Your decision was received through the General-in-chief; discretion was given to me to retain the command, or retire from it. Had circumstances remained as when I asked to be relieved, I should have retired at once; but a material change had taken place: the press, either mistaking or misrepresenting my motives, had denounced me in no very measured terms for asking to be relieved; and the people of the country, as well as the officers of the army, so far as their opinions were made known to me, seemed to desire that I should retain the command. My feelings and interests alike prompted me to retire, but in the position I then found myself, I believed I was not at liberty to do so, and I announced my intention to remain.

Your letter approving my plan of campaign was received on the 7th of August. Measures were immediately adopted to fulfil the views of the Government.

In consequence of the alarm pervading the country, and the inefficiency of the regular troops, caused by their sickly condition, as well as by the want of officers, I had been compelled to give a military organization to the whole population on the frontier. This was a measure attended with considerable expense, but it was the only means in my power of preserving the country from entire devastation. I kept the mounted men constantly scouting to deter the enemy from approaching the settlements, or annoying the inhabitants; and was taking measures to commence active hostilities so soon as a small regular force should arrive.

Whilst thus engaged, the commanding officer at Fort King reported the arrival of several Indians in the vicinity of that post; and stated that the chiefs were desirous of communicating with me. I proceeded thither, and held conferences with them on the 19th and 20th of August. They expressed an earnest desire for peace, but declared the majority of the Indians to be averse to leaving the country. They were distinctly informed that preparation to emigrate must be preliminary to any discussion in relation to peace; that I would confer with them on no other subject; that they must make up their minds to fulfil their treaty and emigrate; that when prepared to communicate to me that determination, a deputation would be received from them; and they were directed to use a white flag to secure them from the attacks of any of our scouting parties that might be out at the time of their approach; and they were assured that after having fulfilled their treaty in good faith, by emigrating to the country assigned them west of the Mississippi, the Executive would receive a deputation from them, and hear and attend to any thing they might have to say.

Coe Hajo, the principal chief present, informed me that many of the Seminole chiefs were in favor of the treaty, and ready to emigrate; but Appiacea and Powell, who controlled the young men, were opposed to the measure, and that the former had threatened with death all who favored it. He added, however, that the chiefs of the nation proposed to hold a council on the St. John in a few days, where their whole policy was to be discussed, and particularly, at his instance, the question of emigration; but he was certain that Appiacea would prevent the council if possible, or at all events oppose the execution of the treaty. He promised to meet me at Fort King in twenty days, and inform me whether the chiefs had met in council, and their determination. In the mean time he desired that hostilities should cease on both sides. Being then in the midst of the sickly season, I assented to the proposition; and it was arranged that the Indians should all withdraw south of Fort Mellon, and on no account return north of that post: that they should neither cross to the eastern side of the St. John, nor to the western side of the Fort King road; and that the violation of any of those terms should be considered an act of hostility.

Coe-Hajo did not return to Fort King at the time appointed; and I learned afterwards that but few chiefs had attended the council, and those who attended, though they made a law to punish any of their people who should commit depredations upon the white inhabitants, decided not to leave the country.

On the 4th of September, several negroes surrendered at Fort Peyton, near St. Augustine, and communicated important information. Lieutenant

Peyton, the commanding officer of the post, made arrangements to proceed with a part of his command, against a body of Indians and negroes, which they represented to be forty or fifty miles below. Brigadier General Hernandez, who commanded the troops and posts east of the St. John, increased the force, took the direction of the movement, and proceeded south; the result of his operations was the surprise and capture of two camps of Indians and negroes, among whom were several important chiefs.

One of the chiefs, Emathla, (King Philip,) desired to communicate with his family, to induce them to surrender. General Hernandez permitted one of the prisoners to bear his message. Coacoochee, (Little Wild Cat,) a son of Philip, returned with the messenger. Philip, after conferring with him, proposed to send him out with messages to the chiefs and people, promising that many of them would return with him. General Hernandez informed me that he was under no obligation to allow him to leave St. Augustine; but, on full consideration of the subject, I deemed it proper to permit him to go with the message of his father. He promised to bring in all the Seminoles of the St. John; but I authorized no one to be invited to come in for any other purpose than to remain. I promised, however, that all who should come in and surrender should receive kind treatment. Previous to his departure, he examined several sites, in company with General Hernandez, for the purpose of determining on a suitable position for an encampment.

He went out, and on the 17th of October, returned and reported that about a hundred Indians, and as many negroes, were on the way to St. Augustine. General Hernandez, with a detachment of troops, went out to meet them. He met the advance at Pelliceer's creek, and directed them to move forward to Fort Peyton, where it was intended they should encamp.

On the 20th, John Cavallo, a sub-chief, a hostage who had violated his parole in May of last year, came into St. Augustine with a message from Powell and Coe-Hajo, stating that they had encamped near the fort, and desired to see General Hernandez. Several negroes came in on the same day: from them I learned that the Indians had but a short time previous killed a white man; that they did not intend to leave the country; that they were desirous of obtaining powder and clothing; and, as some of the negroes expressed it, they had "*come for no good*;" and that, when they sat out for St. Augustine, a party of Miccasukeys and Tallahassee had started from their camp for the Alachua frontier to steal horses and drive off cattle.

The Indians, by their chiefs, had surrendered to me by capitulation at Fort Dade, in March, 1837; and, in addition, Powell had, in May of that year, gone in to Lieutenant Colonel Harney, at Fort Mellon, and had received subsistence to take his band to Tampa Bay. Coe-Hajo had received subsistence for *his* band for the same purpose. The former, in violation of his plighted faith, not only failed to go on himself, but prevented Coe-Hajo, by force and threats, from fulfilling his engagement, which he was attempting faithfully to do. He also attempted to kill Yoholo Hajo, an unarmed herald or messenger, whom, in a period of peace, I had sent to communicate with Coe-Hajo and Nococe Yoholo.

As I had informed the chiefs at Fort King that I would hold no communication with the Seminoles unless they should determine to emigrate; as I had permitted no Indian to come in for any other purpose but to remain;



as they were all prisoners of war, or hostages who had violated their parole; as many of them had violated the truce entered into at Fort King, by occupying the country east of the St. John, by allowing predatory parties to go to the frontier, and by killing at least one white man; and as the white flag had been allowed for no other purpose than to enable them to communicate and come in without danger of attack from our parties, it became my duty to secure them on being satisfied of the fact that they intended to return to their fastnesses. I accordingly required General Hernandez to seize them, and take them to St. Augustine; but, notwithstanding their character as prisoners and hostages who had violated their parole, and who, according to the laws of war, as recognised by civilized nations, had forfeited their lives, I directed that they should be treated with every kindness, and have every accommodation consistent with their security.

Soon after the seizure of the Indians, Powell and Coe-Hajo requested an interview with me. I saw them at my quarters, at St. Augustine. They informed me that Miconopy, Jumper, Holatochee, and the greater part of the Seminoles were ready to execute their treaty, and were only deterred from coming in by the Miccasukeys. They advised that messengers be sent to Miconopy and Jumper, and requested to be allowed to send for their own people, who, they said, would come in on being assured that their lives would be spared. I permitted them to send messengers to their families and people, and I sent a messenger to Miconopy.

The principal Indian force on the 1st of October, as I ascertained about the 10th of that month, was concentrated on the Upper St. John, though there were several small roving bands north of Fort Mellon and Tampa Bay, and other bands spread over the country south to Florida point. The theatre of my operations extended over more than five degrees of latitude. To cover a country so vast, forty posts were required to be occupied during the campaign, and I was obliged to operate from a base extending from Charlotte's Harbor, by the way of the Suwannee, to St. Augustine, upwards of three hundred miles.

I had desired to commence operations on the 1st of October, because, at that time, the St. John is navigable a greater distance than at a later period; and I could then have availed myself of more than two months of the services of the Florida troops, whose term of service expired in December. The regular troops, however, did not begin to arrive until near the last of October, and they continued to come in until December. The principal volunteer force arrived about the 1st of December.

Colonel Smith, of Louisiana, was ordered to enter the peninsula through the Colooshehatchee. His operations covered the whole country from that river south to Cape Sable. The results were one or two skirmishes in which he lost a few men, probably killed some of the enemy, and took two hundred and forty-three prisoners.

General Taylor was directed to proceed from Tampa Bay, open a road in nearly an eastern direction into the heart of the country, establish a post on the head of Peas creek, another on the Kissimmee, and attack the enemy in that quarter. His operations covered the whole country east of the Fort King road, Tampa Bay, and the Gulf of Mexico, from the Withlacoochee to the Colooshehatchee, and east of the Kissimmee to the eastern line of the Okechobee. He came up with the enemy on the Okechobee on the 25th of December, attacked them, and in one of the best fought actions

known to our history, gained a complete victory, though with great loss of officers and men. The enemy have acknowledged a loss of fourteen killed. During the whole of General Taylor's operations he has taken and secured four hundred and eighty-four Indians and negroes.

Brigadier General Nelson, with a brigade of Georgia volunteers, was directed to secure the frontier of Middle Florida, and the western part of East Florida. His operations covered the country west of the Fort King road, from the southern point of the Annuttaliga swamp to the Withlacoochee, and to the head of that river; thence to the Suwannee; and thence west of that river, and south of the Tallahassee road to Stein Hatchee; the whole distance on the coast being a continued swamp, extending from the Gulf of Mexico to the interior from ten to thirty miles, and along the gulf a hundred and fifty miles, (further than from this city to Philadelphia.) He had several skirmishes with the enemy, and the result of his operations, so far as they have been reported to me, are six Indians killed, and fourteen prisoners.

Colonel Snodgrass, with a battalion of Alabama volunteers, was ordered to scour the swamps and hammocks between Black creek and the Ocklawaha, and drive out, capture, or destroy, any Indians in that section of country, and then to operate between the St. John and Ocklawaha. He performed the duty assigned to him north of the latter river; then crossed to the east of the St. John at Picolata; passed around Dunn's lake; and, re-crossing at Volusia, took a position at the Four Lakes, about twenty miles west of that post. His operations covered the country between the St. John and the Ocklawaha, and west of the latter to Fort King and around Orange lake, and through the swamps about Orange Lake creek. He destroyed several Indian villages, and though often on the trails of small bodies of Indians, he succeeded in taking but one prisoner.

Lieutenant Colonel Coffee, of the Alabama volunteers, was ordered to proceed by land from Garey's Ferry to Fort Mellon with four companies. He marched to Fort King; then proceeded to the Okeehumka hammock; crossed the Ocklawaha immediately below the outlet of Ahapopka lake; moved along the eastern side of that lake, and thence to Fort Mellon. He was afterwards sent on an expedition from Fort Christmas to Tohopkeliga.

Major Lauderdale, with the Tennessee volunteers, crossed the St. John at Picolata; traversed the country between that river and the Atlantic to Volusia, and thence to Lake Monroe.

General Hernandez commenced operations east of the St. John in September. After securing Powell and Coe-Hajo and their bands, he was ordered south to Spring Garden, where he made several prisoners. He was again ordered forward to New Smyrna, when the general movement of the army took place; his mounted men by land, and foot by water, on the Atlantic. He caused posts to be established at New Smyrna, and at the haul-over, from Mosquito Lagoon to Indian river; made arrangements to receive supplies west of Indian river; turned the head of it; and then traversed the country to Lake Monroe, where he communicated with me at Fort Mellon. Here the Tennesseans joined him, and he proceeded forward to the head of the St. John. Lieutenant Colonel Pierce, with several companies of his regiment, (the 1st artillery,) moved in barges down Indian river, to the inlet, where he established a post, built Fort Pierce, and employed his command in bringing supplies from the haul-over to the fort, and thence to Fort Jupiter. The result of General Hernandez's operations was

two Indians killed, and two hundred and ninety-seven Indians and negroes taken.

Lieutenant Powell, of the navy, with a small naval and military force, proceeded south from Fort Pierce, to examine the south lagoon of that river as far as Jupiter inlet. He landed at the head of one of the branches of Jupiter river; fell in with and attacked a body of Indians; and, after a most gallant effort, was overpowered by numbers, and compelled to retreat with the loss of several officers and men killed and wounded. He killed three Indians and a negro, and made one prisoner.

General Eustis having organized the regular troops by assigning the recruits to companies, and having caused Volusia and Fort Mellon to be occupied, and proper garrisons to mounted men and foot to be placed at the several posts on the frontier to Fort King, proceeded from Garey's Ferry on the 17th of November to Fort Mellon. Colonel Twiggs had been previously detached to Volusia with instructions to examine the country between the St. John and Ochlawaha; and Colonel Mills had been detached from the Suwannee frontier, via Fort King, to the same point, with orders to scour the country on his route. I accompanied General Eustis's command to Volusia, and there joining the mounted force under Colonel Twiggs and Colonel Mills, proceeded to Fort Mellon by land, where I arrived on the 26th of November. Late in that month, the chief Coa-Coochee, with seventeen of his band, escaped from Saint Augustine.

At Fort Mellon, I found the messengers sent out by Powell and Coe-Hajo and the messenger I had sent to Micconopy. That chief sent me word that he was ready to fulfil the arrangement made at Fort Dade, and he had no doubt of inducing the chiefs and the greater part of his people to surrender.

Previous to my departure from Picolata, a deputation of Cherokee chiefs arrived with a talk from their principal chief, John Ross, to the Seminoles. That talk contained, as I thought, propositions at variance with my instructions. It held out to the Seminoles the promise of a treaty; but I was required to enforce the provisions of an *existing* treaty, not to make a *new* treaty. The deputation were told that unless the talk were modified, they would not be allowed to present it. They were permitted to go to Fort Mellon, where, having consented to change the more objectionable parts of the talk, they were allowed to proceed on their mission. Coe-Hajo, who was desirous of collecting and emigrating his people, was sent out as a guide to the Cherokees, and as my messenger to the Seminole chiefs. I authorized no assurances to be given to the Indians that they were to come to my camp and be permitted to return. I promised them protection and kind treatment. If the Cherokees promised more, it was on their own responsibility and without my authority. Coe-Hajo returned with many of his people, accompanied by the Cherokees, and by the chiefs Micconopy, Cloud, Toskegee, and Nocose Yoholo, with fifteen or twenty of their followers. Micconopy reported that he had come to remain with me, and assured me that his people would come in and emigrate.

A council was held; the chiefs agreed to fulfil their treaty; they designated messengers to be sent out to collect their people, and bring them to camp. Some of the Cherokees accompanied those messengers; they returned with favorable reports; went out again, returned, and reported the failure of their mission. During the last visit of the Cherokees, most of the attendants of Micconopy and Cloud left them. Micconopy reported their

flight to me, and desired that they might be pursued; and Coe-Hajo, fearing that some of his people might follow their example, requested that they might be brought into camp.

The Cherokees returned to Washington. I lost fifteen most important days, by their negotiation—a delay, the consequences of which no subsequent effort could retrieve; for, in the mean time, the Seminoles had dispersed, and the water in the St. John had fallen so low as to compel me to use boats propelled by oars and poles, to transport supplies to the depots which I found it necessary to establish farther south on that river.

The Seminole chiefs, with Coe-Hajo and his people, in all seventy-two, were ordered to St. Augustine, and thence, with those taken with Powell, to Charleston.

Major Dearborn was sent forward, with a detachment and supplies, in barges, to establish a depot at the head of Lake Harney; and General Eustis moved, with the principal force, by land. The country was so difficult, that his march was necessarily slow. He erected Fort Christmas, at Powelstown, on the 25th of December, and arrived on the 6th of January at Fort Taylor, a post about a hundred miles south of Fort Mellon, established by Colonel Twiggs, who had been sent in advance.

Lieutenant Searle had been sent up the St. John, to explore it; and Colonel Harney had followed, with several barges, loaded with forage. They ascertained the practicability of navigating the river to Fort Taylor.

On the 6th of January, leaving General Eustis to follow, with the foot and a squadron of dragoons, I moved forward from Fort Taylor, with about five hundred mounted men, dragoons and volunteers, for the purpose of communicating with General Taylor. Previous to my departure, Lieutenant Ross had arrived, with abundant supplies, in barges. On the 7th, I crossed the Big Cypress swamp, and, discovering fresh trails of Indians, sent out several scouting parties. One of them fell in with a small body of Indians, of whom they killed one warrior, and captured another, whom we employed as a guide. On the 9th, I arrived at the head of the St. John, where General Hernandez joined me, from the eastern side of the river. On the 10th, I proceeded forward, for the purpose of finding General Taylor's route. On the 11th, the guide informed me that he had mistaken the trail, and brought me too far to the east. As it was important, not only to communicate with General Taylor, but to be certain of supplies at Fort Pierce, I directed the troops to fall back to the camp, near the head of the St. John, whence they were moved to Fort Pierce. Having obtained a supply of forage, and directed that a depot be established on the St. Lucey river, I returned to camp, where I found General Eustis. He had opened a communication with Fort Bassinger, on the Kissimmee.

On the 20th, the army moved from the head of the St. John, and on the 24th came up with the enemy strongly posted on the Locha-Hatchee; attacked, beat, and dispersed them; crossed the river on the 25th, and encamped on Jupiter bay. A stockade (Fort Jupiter) was erected here. The column was delayed at this post for shoes, and other supplies, until the 5th of February; but, in the mean time, the mounted troops were kept actively employed. Every thing necessary being received, it was put in motion on that day, and encamped about twelve miles in advance. In the evening, General Eustis called on me and urged me to terminate the war by an arrangement with the Indians, by which they should be left in the southern part of Florida; he believing, as I did, that, from the nature of the country



in which we were operating, no permanent advantage could be obtained except by peaceable means. The General expressed the most decided opinion that the department would approve the measure. I promised to consider it. On the 6th, the column moved forward, and in the afternoon the officers in advance reported three or four fresh moccasin tracks, and stated that the trail had taken nearly a westerly direction. I ordered the troops to encamp, and sent a detachment of dragoons, with several Shawnee Indians, forward, accompanied by my aid-de-camp, Lieutenant Linnard, to reconnoitre the country. The detachment returned and reported "fresh signs of a small party of Indians." While it was out, Colonel Twiggs, with other superior officers of the army, called on me, and urged, as General Eustis had, that I should terminate the war by allowing the Indians to retain part of the country: they believing that no decided advantage could be gained over them unless they could be withdrawn from the swamps. Understanding from those gentlemen that most, if not all, the superior officers of the army entertained similar views, I, on full consideration, decided to send a messenger to the Indians, and offer them peace; but I determined on no account to grant them the privilege of remaining in the country, unless the measure should be sanctioned by the Government.

Early on the morning of the 7th, a Seminole negro was sent out to endeavor to come up with the Indians, and invite the chiefs to a conference. The column was put in motion about eight o'clock, and had proceeded several miles, when the trail appeared to terminate. Parties were sent forward in various directions; the trail was found, and when the troops were about to advance, General Eustis reported to me that several Indians were waiting for me with a flag, in advance of a cypress swamp in front of the army. I met them: a young chief, Halleck-Hajo, conducted the conference on their part. He spoke of the wretched condition of the Indians, and of their ardent desire for peace; but declared that the greater part of them wished to remain in the country; that they would thankfully receive from us any part of it, however small, that we might think proper to assign for their residence. He added that, if required to leave the country, they must go. I demanded hostages or the surrender of their arms. He would not consent to either, from the impossibility, as I afterwards learned, of enforcing obedience to such a measure. I required that Toskegee, the principal chief of the party, should attend. He met me next day with Halleck-Hajo, and after some discussion it was arranged that the Indians should assemble within ten days, in a camp near Fort Jupiter, with their families, and await the decision of the President whether they should remain in the country. I promised them to recommend that a small district should be assigned for their residence in the south part of the peninsula, and they agreed, if the Miccasukses should not come in, to furnish guides to conduct the troops to their fastnesses. Though the arrangement for allowing the Indians to remain in the country was urged upon me by General Eustis, Colonel Twiggs, and other superior officers, I adopted it on my own responsibility. I mention the fact now, not to remove any part of the blame which may be attached to the measure from myself to them, but to show that their opinions of the course best adapted to subserve the interests of the country coincided with mine. I believed then, and I believe now, that, as the commander-in-chief of the army in the field, I had the right to adopt those measures, either of direct hostility or of policy, which promised to be most successful in the

end, taking care not to place the ultimate decision of them beyond the control of my official superiors. The measure which I adopted has resulted in the peaceable surrender of between eleven and twelve hundred Indians and negroes, three hundred and nineteen of whom are warriors, or men capable of bearing arms. Had any other course been adopted, it is questionable whether twenty warriors could have been killed or taken.

Having been apprized, by prisoners taken in the preceding campaign, of an arrangement entered into previous to the war, through the Seminole negroes, between the Indians and the slaves, that so soon as hostilities should commence the latter were to join them and take up arms, I informed the Indians that all their negroes must be separated from them, and sent out of the country. On the 27th of February, I sent off a party of Indians and negroes to Tampa Bay, on their way to the west.

Before I received your decision on my proposition in favor of the Indians, the second chief of the nation, Hola-too-chee, had joined me from New Orleans. Through his influence I had gained the chiefs who had come in, and I apprehended no difficulty as to emigrating their people. Toskegee assured me that he would go to the west, even should the Government give him land in Florida; and Halleck-Hajo declared that he was ready to obey the orders of the President, and at all events he would not separate from his negroes.

Your decision in relation to the Indians was received on the 17th of March. On the 19th, I directed the Seminole chiefs to meet me in council at 12 o'clock on the 20th. Toskegee sent me word that he did not wish to attend; that he and his people would go with Holatoochee; and that I must manage Passac-Micco and his party. None of the chiefs attended the council, and I directed Colonel Twiggs to seize the whole party. Five hundred and thirteen Indians were secured on the 21st and the two succeeding days, which, with a hundred and sixty-five negroes, that at different times were taken and sent to Tampa Bay, made an aggregate, taken at Jupiter, of six hundred and seventy-eight. Passac-Micco, with fourteen others, escaped.

On the 24th of March, I detached Holatoochee, Tustenuck-cocho-conee, and the negro chief Abraham, to General Taylor. They were sent out with messages to the Seminoles west of Okeechobee and Pahäi-okee, and prevailed upon Alligator, with three hundred and sixty Indians and negroes, of whom a hundred were warriors, to surrender to Colonel Smith and General Taylor.

Major Lauderdale had been detached with a company of the 3d artillery, and two hundred Tennessee volunteers, to explore the country south, and to establish a post at New river. Previous to his arrival there, two of our people had been killed by some of Toskegee's warriors. We were then in the midst of a truce; the Indians were afterwards captured, and the property of the murdered men found upon them.

Hearing from Indians who had come in, that Appiaccia was in the everglades near New river, I ordered General Eustis to proceed to that point with additional force; but, in consequence of depredations committed by the Indians in Middle Florida, his destination was changed, and he was sent to the north frontier of the Territory; and Lieut. Colonel Bankhead, with a strong detachment of the 1st and 4th artillery, was ordered to New river.

On arriving at New river, Lieutenant Colonel Bankhead, by means of messengers furnished by Toskegee, communicated with the Indians. They

promised to meet him, but failed to do so; and he prepared to attack them. He was joined by Lieut. Powell of the navy, and Major Lauderdale, with their commands; and having captured, by a detachment under Lieut. Anderson, Pahose-Micco, a sub-chief of Toskegee, with his band of forty-seven persons, he proceeded into the everglades in pursuit of Appiaca. The nature of the country was such that the soldiers could not carry even their cartridge-boxes. They were compelled to deposit them with their muskets in light boats, which they pushed before them through the mud for many miles to an island where they found the Indians. Lieut. Colonel Bankhead attempted to communicate with them, but they fired on his flag. He attacked and dispersed them; but the troops were unable to find or follow them.

Lieut. Colonel Harney relieved Lieut. Colonel Bankhead in command. He pursued the Indians, came up with Appiaca, (Sam Jones,) fifteen or twenty miles southwest of Key Biscayne, attacked and beat him; and he was making arrangements for a further pursuit when he was recalled.

I crossed from Fort Jupiter to Tampa Bay in April, to attack the Miccasukees and Tallahasseees, in the swamps to which they had retired near the mouth of the Withlacoochee, and was drawing troops to that quarter, and had Indian guides employed who were acquainted with the positions which they occupied, when I received general order No. 7, directing the movement of the troops to the Cherokee country, and relieving me from command. I was compelled reluctantly to abandon the enterprise.

The chiefs Coe-Hajo, Toskegee, Halle-Hajo, Tuste-nuecochoconee, and many others, have declared that the Cherokee deputation assured them in council, that the Indians were to remain in the country, and that I was carrying on the war contrary to the orders of the President. This accords with information received through the negro chief Abraham, in December, and the negro Auguste, in February.

Fifty-four Indians and negroes surrendered at Fort Mellon in November; sixty-five had been taken in small bands at different times during the campaign; several Indians had been reported to have been killed by small scouting parties in Middle Florida, and the western part of East Florida; and messengers whom I had sent out to the Ocklewaha had brought into Fort King, before I left the country, twenty-four Indians.

The number of Indians and negroes altogether, who surrendered or were taken by the army, from the 4th of September, 1837, until I left Florida, amounted to nineteen hundred and seventy-eight, twenty-three of whom escaped, leaving nineteen hundred and fifty-five actually secured; and I estimate the killed at thirty-five, though I am confident, from the admission of the chiefs, that with those who died of their wounds, the number of killed was much greater. Of this number killed and taken, the warriors, or those capable of bearing arms, exceeded six hundred.

From the time I commenced operations, in December, 1836, to the 4th of September, 1837, the number of Indians and negroes killed and taken by the different detachments of the army, were equal to about four hundred, over a hundred of whom were warriors, or men capable of bearing arms.

It will thus be seen that during the whole period of my command in Florida, the Indians and negroes taken, with those who voluntarily surrendered, amounted to near twenty-four hundred, over seven hundred of whom were warriors.

The villages of the Indians have all been destroyed; and their cattle, horses, and other stock, with nearly all their other property, taken or destroyed. The swamps and hammocks have been every where penetrated, and the whole country traversed from the Georgia line to the southern extremity of Florida; and the small bands who remain dispersed over that extensive region, have nothing of value left but their rifles.

These results, trifling as they are compared with those of the Creek campaign and with public expectation, are greatly beyond what we had any right to hope, when we consider the nature and extent of the country which has been the theatre of operations, and our utter ignorance of the greater part of it, even when we commenced the last campaign. Nothing but the untiring devotion of both officers and soldiers to their duties, and the energy and efficiency of the different branches of the staff, could have enabled me to overcome the difficulties which surrounded me, so far as to accomplish what has been done.

If our operations have fallen short of public expectations, it should be remembered that we were attempting that which no other armies of our country had ever before been required to do. I and my predecessors in command were not only required to fight, beat, and drive the enemy before us, but to go into an unexplored wilderness and catch them. Neither Wayne, Harrison, nor Jackson, was required to do this; and unless the objects to be accomplished be the same, there can be no just comparison as to the results.

I have the honor to be,

Sir, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP.

To the Hon. J. R. POINSETT,

*Secretary of War, Washington.*